Using the preference-based approach to power analysis of the International Monetary Fund from Aleskerov, Kalyagin & Pogorelskiy (2008) , which allows for estimating the power of the IMF members within the Executive Board and the Fund in general through the existing constituency system, we explore a new model of members' preferences to coalesce. The preferences in this model are based on the data on countries' bilateral trade.
Introduction
Formal analysis of voting power distribution in the functioning voting bodies is based on the likelihood of a situation in which a voter is decisive, i.e., is able to swing a division of the voting body into those voting 'yes' and 'no' in the voter's preferred direction. One could argue that this is when the actual power is revealed.
On the other hand, a member's voting power is still commonly viewed as a share of the total number of votes she owns. Although intuitively compelling, the latter statement is inconsistent with the aforementioned idea of power since having a non-zero voting share is not sufficient for being able (at least formally) to affect the collective decision. Many artificial and real cases demonstrate this discrepancy (see Leech (2002) , Aleskerov, Kalyagin & Pogorelskiy (2008) ), but its inappropriateness can also be inferred from the following trivial example.
Suppose we have a voting body where not all voters have the same voting shares and the decision making rule is simple majority, i.e., at least half 2 of the total votes is needed to pass a decision. Select any voter and assume that her power can be measured as her voting share.
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Consider a situation in which the voting body remains the same, but the decision making rule has changed: now unanimity of votes is required to pass a decision. Clearly, in the latter case everybody has the same power to affect the collective decision: all votes are needed. The voting shares, however, have not changed. This example shows that in addition to voting shares, power also depends on the quota 3 .
To capture all factors defining power it is generally accepted to use a special measure called power index. The most widely known classical power indices are those introduced by Penrose (1946) , Banzhaf (1965) , Coleman (1971) and Shapley-Shubik (1954) . It should be noted that these indices do not use any additional information about the voting body, just vote distribution and the quota, and thus are often referred to as a priori power indices. For a power analysis of functioning voting bodies to have this basic information is not enough: one also needs to know the probability distribution on possible divisions of the body.
A fairly reasonable, but not indisputable way to derive this distribution is by introducing voters' preferences to coalesce into the model. The major assumption of the approach is that these preferences determine voters' willingness to vote together and hence to form coalitions.
There are some recent findings supporting this assumption at least in laboratory experiments (see Aleskerov, Belianin & Pogorelskiy (2009) ).
This paper applies the preference-based voting power analysis to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Fund itself is an interesting object for research not only because of its significant role in the world economy, but also because of the representativeness issues that have been accompanying it since its creation in 1944 (for more details, see Mikesell (1994) ).
Several papers have been published that concentrated on a priori voting power analysis of the current governing bodies of the IMF (see Leech (2002) , Alonso-Meijide & Bowles (2005) ), while another strand of literature used the same approach (i.e., classical power indices) for analysis of the changes in power distribution arising from some modifications in the Fund's structure and the rules of governance (a recent work is Leech & Leech (2009) ). Concerning the preference-based power indices, the only paper to employ this methodology for the power analysis of the IMF was Aleskerov, Kalyagin & Pogorelskiy (2008) .
In this paper we use a new model of the countries' preferences to coalesce. As defining factor in this model we consider the countries' bilateral trade.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the IMF governance structures, in Section 3 the main notions of the model are given, Section 4 deals with the voting power analysis in the Fund and its results, Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains the power indices for the IMF members for both models.
The Governance of the Fund
This paper is primarily concerned with a single aspect of the IMF governance -the one related to members' voting power they possess in the process of decision making. 
The model
Below we briefly repeat some notation from Aleskerov, Kalyagin & Pogorelskiy (2008) in order to make this paper self-contained.
Power indices taking into account members' preferences
Let V be a generic constituency comprising l countries that uses a decision making rule with a quota 6 set at q. We assume that no country is allowed to abstain from voting. A coalition here is conventionally understood as a subset of countries voting in the same way. ߱ ⊆ ܸ is a winning coalition, if it can determine the collective decision of ܸ without other countries' votes, i.e., the sum of the votes of countries from ω is not less than q. Otherwise, the respective coalition is a losing one.
A country in a winning coalition is called pivotal if the coalition ceases to be winning in case of this country's exit. A coalition ω is a swing for country i∉ω, if ω is a losing one while ω+{i} is a winning one.
6 Note that quota here means the decision making rule and not a country's IMF quota. For constituencies we assume that the simple majority rule is used for taking decisions, i.e., q is determined by Following Felsenthal & Machover (2002) , to evaluate the power of every country in the Executive Board we adopt the approach described below:
-Consider a system of indirect voting.
-The total power of each country is defined by its power in a given constituency and the power of the constituency in the Executive Board. Namely, the power index ߨ(݅, ܸ) representing i's total power in the Board (with i belonging to the constituency V ) is the arithmetic product of the country's power index in the given constituency (denoted by ߙ(݅)) and the power index of constituency ܸ in the Executive Board (denoted by ߢ(ܸ)) .
At the constituency level we use a modification of the Penrose power index that allows for taking into account the agents' preferences to coalesce.
Assume that the cardinal preferences of each country to coalesce with any other country of the same constituency are given in the respective preference profile
where n is the total number of members of the Fund, and ‫‬ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, ݅, ݆ ∈ {1, . . , ݊}. Define the mean intensity of country i's connections with other members of the same coalition ω as follows (Aleskerov (2006) ).
Let us define the mean intensity of connections of other countries of ω with i by
and the mean intensity of connections within a coalition by
The intensity ݂ ା (߱) may be interpreted as a likelihood of country i joining ω (if this coalition has formed) based on i's pairwise propensities (defined in accordance with the preference profile of the country i) to join each country of the coalition.
The intensity݂ ି (߱) is similar to (1) with the distinction that in (2) the preferences of other countries about i joining their coalition are taken into account. In some sense this may be understood as acceptance of the country i by the members of coalitionω .
The intensity ݂(߱) characterizes the average intensity of connection among the countries of coalitionω . It may be seen as likelihood that coalition ω acts as a bloc, i.e., all the members of the coalition vote in the same way. Note that when calculating the sum in the numerator of (3), for each agent i evaluated is her mean intensity of connections with other members of the coalition, i.e. ω\{i}.
The constituency level power index α of a country i is then defined as
where l is the number of countries of the constituency, v(i) is the number of votes of country i, q is the quota for a decision to be taken. This is an absolute power index. Note that if we assume for all coalitions ߱ ݂ ା (߱) = 1, (4) becomes the Penrose (1946) The index (4) can be interpreted as a ratio of the summarised intensity of i's potentially possible connections with those coalitions which are swings for i, to a maximum possible value for the intensity of connections in a given constituency providing that i is not a dictator. If, on the other hand, the number of i's votes exceeds the quota, her preferences over coalescing with other participants lose their meaning because i can determine the decision by herself. Hence, provided that the quota is greater than 50% of the total votes, the voting power of other members is always zero (they cannot swing any vote), and i is decisive (i.e., completely define the outcome of the ballot) with certainty.
At the level of the Executive Board we define the power of a constituency in probabilistic terms. We are going to assume that the constituencies vote independently, while their probabilities to vote for or against a decision depend on their members' preferences to coalesce in the following way: the probability for a constituency V to vote "yes" is given by
In other words, for every winning coalition ω the function f (ω) defines a degree of inner consolidation reflected in the probability of forming such a coalition. Note that if for all coalitions ݂(߱) = 1, then formula (5) gives "The Power of the Body to Act" (PTA) -a power index devised by Coleman (1971) .
Our assumption that different constituencies vote independently results in ruling out the possibility of constituencies to form alliances. The reason is the need to have aggregate preferences to coalesce over constituencies. Such aggregation seems inadequate for the preference factors considered due to diversity of countries in existing constituencies.
The power of a constituency ܸ at the level of the Executive Board is then defined as its probability of being decisive, given by
The sum in (6) is taken over all those partitions of the Executive Board (which is denoted by ܰ) into coalitions voting "yes" (the subset ܵ) and "no" (the complement ܰ\ܵ since abstention from voting is not allowed) for which the constituency ܸ makes a swing. For more details on derivation of this formula, see Aleskerov, Kalyagin &Pogorelskiy (2008) . Now for each country i of the constituency ܸ the total power index is a product of α and κ, i.e.,
The assumptions regarding the governance of the Executive Board
As a rule of decision making at the level of the Executive Board we separately consider all the three types of majority (namely, simple, qualified 70%, and 85% of the total votes).
For decision making process at the constituency level the simple majority rule is used.
All members have profiles of preferences to coalesce with other countries of their constituency, which are used as a basis for determining a country's power index within the constituency.
A preference profile is a set of intensities of connection -these are interpreted as country i's wish to form a coalition with country j -defined by bilateral trade with the country j in the following way
Here ݅, ݆ ∈ ܸ (both countries belong to the same constituency), ܺ is the absolute value of total exports from country ݅ to ݆; ܶܺ is the total exports from country ݅ to the world.
Note that (8) expresses the intensity of connection arising from bilateral trade as the share of exports of country i to country j in the total exports of country i to all countries of the respective constituency. The assumption is that a higher value of ‫‬ define a more important partner for country ݅. 
Main results
The calculated power indices for all countries are given in the Appendix А.
As could be expected (recall the example from the introduction), the increase of the quota from the simple majority to the qualified majority of 85% lessens the absolute power of all constituencies.
It is worth noting that although the US have the maximal absolute power under a simple majority rule, if we take the majority of 70%, then the Belgian constituency has the greatest power and under the majority of 85% the Dutch constituency takes the lead.
We discuss two main reasons for this fact.
First, a constituency acquires most of its power because of its votes (as the quota increases, the smaller players significantly gain in the number of swings).
Second, due to a relatively small value of the respective probability to vote "yes" (defined by (5)) for both the Belgian and the Dutch constituencies, the winning coalitions organized by other members become less likely, which in turn decreases the power of other constituencies.
For every constituency we also calculated the Penrose and Banzhaf power indices, which were then compared to the κ indices and their normalized versions, respectively. The results of comparison are given in the tables below. Table 4 .1 shows that for a simple majority case the values of Penrose index are always greater than those of κ power index. This is due to the fact that the Penrose power index assumes all coalitions equiprobable, which is equivalent to requiring each member's probability to vote "yes" or "no" be the same and equal 0.5. In this case every swing for a member adds ଵ ଶ షభ to the total value of the index. For the κ power index each swing for a member adds the product of probabilities of those voting "yes" and those voting "no" to the total value. As these probabilities are generally different, their product might be different from ଵ ଶ షభ , depending on the division of the members in the ballot outcome. The calculations reveal that on average each swing "invests" less in the total value of the κ power index than in the Penrose one, affecting the resulting value which is also less. When normalizing it results in an increase in power share of the constituencies with the largest absolute power effectively decreasing the power shares of the remaining members. Thus, the Banzhaf index (i.e., the normalized Penrose index) is less than the κ power index for most constituencies. Table 4 .2 demonstrates that the abovementioned relation between the Penrose and κ indices also holds for the quota set at 70%; the Penrose index significantly decreases for all countries while the κ index simply plunges. In effect this means an increasing role of preferences for a higher quota. With regards to the normalized versions of indices, as preference-based absolute power tends to equalize, more countries express deviations in either direction from the benchmark case of the Banzhaf index. Table 4 .3 shows the further decrease of the absolute voting power as the quota increases up to 85%. In effect this is the case where individual countries are not at all powerful on their own; it may indicate a need for a more general concept of power that could deal with such situations.
Turning to the analysis of the α power indices at the constituency level, note that taking into account countries' preferences almost always (except for the two extreme cases: a country with zero power and a dictator country, see below ) decreases the value of this index compared to the analogous Penrose index. Indeed, it follows from (4) that for the α index to reach the value of the Penrose index, we need to have maximum possible preferences values (equal 1) for all countries, which is not the case in reality.
From all constituencies we may pick out those having a "dictator" 8 , i.e., a country with the number of votes exceeding 50% of all votes of a constituency 9 . For such countries both the α and Penrose indices equals 1.
For all other countries in such constituencies the α power index, as well as the Penrose one equals 0 as there have no swings (in total there are 41 countries with zero voting power, mostly developing ones (see appendix A)).
Besides, the absolute power indices may be 0 for a country even when the constituency does not have a "dictator", but the number of votes of this country does not allow it to have even a single swing. An example can be found in the Sweden constituency, where the power index of Estonia is zero.
In all other cases the values of the α power index are non-zero, but depending on the constituency structure may be very close to zero for some countries. Table 4 .4 shows an example for the Belgian constituency. Table 4 .4 states that Belgium have the maximal power (about 0.1), while the power of all other countries does not exceed 2×10 -2 . Such small value of power is mostly determined by the fact that Belgium has 40.63% of the total votes of its constituency. But there is also another factor: the preference matrix of the constituency members 10 (Table 4 .5), which could explain the difference in power between the countries with about the same number of votes. For instance, the possible number of swings for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg and Slovak Republic is the same: 16; for the case of Belgium this value is 464. Hence, the difference in power between the countries with the same number of swings is determined just by their preferences, mainly those of coalescing with Belgium since it is pivotal in almost all winning coalitions.
Thus, for example, the power of Luxembourg is about 1.56 times greater than that of Kazakhstan, and Luxembourg's preferences to coalesce with Belgium are 0.6457, while those of Kazakhstan are just 0.0223. Note that Belgium's preference to coalesce is also greater for Luxembourg than for Kazakhstan.
Another example is the Czech Republic and Hungary. Hungary has a greater number of votes than the Czech Republic, but both have the same number of possible swings. The countries' preference to coalesce with Belgium is approximately the same, too, but Belgium prefers the Czech Republic to Hungary which is reflected in a greater value of the α power index for the Czech Republic.
These results confirm that under a greater majority rule voting power depends on voters' preferences to coalesce, which effect may outweigh the factor of the number of votes. 
Conclusions
For the Fund members we have calculated their preferences to coalesce based on their structure of exports. The preference-based power indices were calculated for the three cases of a quota value for a decision to be taken.
The analysis showed a remarkable difference between the values of the proposed indices and the classical Penrose and Banzhaf ones. We argue that under a greater majority voting rule the countries' preferences to coalesce become an important factor that in effect defines their power.
Appendix А Power indices of the IMF members Notes:
* The titles of the constituencies are formed from the names of the countries, providing the Executive Directors for these constituencies. The five countries with the largest quotas (the USA, Japan, Germany, France, the UK) appoint their Executive Directors. Three countries (China, Saudi Arabia, Russia), having the number of votes sufficient to elect the Executive Director without the need for creating a constituency, in effect, also appoints their Directors. Therefore the α power indices for these countries as well as for those with the number of votes exceeding 50% of the total votes in a constituency, equal 1. For all the remaining countries in such constituencies their power indices equal 0. ** The countries, which did not participate in the elections due to suspension of the voting rights, or other reasons, are not listed in the table.
